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We present a nonparametric approach for (1) eﬃciency and (2) equity evaluation in
education. Firstly, we use a nonparametric (Data Envelopment Analysis) model that is
specially tailored to assess educational eﬃciency at the pupil level. The model accounts
for the fact that typically minimal prior structure is available for the behavior (objectives
and feasibility set) under evaluation. It allows for uncertainty in the data, while it
corrects for exogenous ‘environmental’ characteristics that are speciﬁc to each pupil.
Secondly, we propose two multidimensional stochastic dominance criteria as naturally
complementary aggregation criteria for comparing the performance of diﬀerent school
t y p e s( p r i v a t ea n dp u b l i cs c h o o l s ) ;t h e s ec r i t e r i aa r es p e c i ﬁcally designed for aggregating
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1pupils’ output performance while adjusting for environment-corrected ineﬃciency. While
the ﬁrst criterion only accounts for eﬃciency, the second criterion also takes equity
into consideration. The model is applied for comparing private (but publicly funded)
and public primary schools in Flanders. Our application ﬁnds that no school type
robustly dominates another type when controlling for the school environment and taking
equity into account. More generally, it demonstrates the usefulness of our nonparametric
approach, which includes environmental and equity considerations, for obtaining ‘fair’
performance comparisons in the public sector context.
Keywords: equity; eﬃciency; private versus public education; nonparametric analysis;
Data Envelopment Analysis; stochastic dominance
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
An important theme in policy evaluation is whether public funds are used in an eﬃcient and
equitable way. In the speciﬁc context of education, the comparison between private –but,
possibly, publicly funded– schools and public schools is at the heart of a debate, which
s t a r t e dw i t ht h ew o r ko fC o l e m a net al. (1982). They ﬁnd that (1) catholic school students
achieve higher standardized test scores than public school students (while controlling for
family background); and (2) this is particularly the case for minority students. Therefore, one
could conclude that catholic schools were both more eﬃcient and more equitable than public
schools in the U.S. at that time. The work of Coleman et al. was (and still is) controversial,
not only in the public debate (see, e.g., the New York Times articles of April 7, April 12 and
April 26, 1981, discussing the consequences of Coleman et al.’s results for the introduction
of tuition tax credits and/or school vouchers), but also in academics (see, e.g., Cain and
Goldberger, 1983, for an overview). In spite of these criticisms, many studies have conﬁrmed
the outperformance of public by private schools; see, e.g., the literature overview in Altonji
et al. (2005a).
Most studies consider diﬀerences between public and private schools in the US on the
basis of parametric regression techniques. Toma (1996) argues that further investigation us-
2ing diﬀerent case-studies and/or diﬀerent methodologies is needed. First, the US educational
system is rather diﬀerent compared to, e.g., European systems. Private schools in the US his-
torically represent only a small percentage of all pupils. The relative outperformance could
vanish if the private educational system operates at a diﬀerent scale. In addtion, it is not
clear to what extent the outperformance of public by private schools in the US has to be
attributed to the diﬀerent ideological vision on education or rather to the diﬀerent ways these
schools are funded. Although Hanushek and Raymond (2005) do not focus on public-private
diﬀerentials, they show that the diﬀerent funding systems in the diﬀerent US states lead to
diﬀerent outcomes. In this study, we compare private (catholic) and public primary schools
in Flanders, i.e., a region in Belgium, where the number of pupils in both school types is
roughly equal and all schools are fully funded by the government. Second, most studies
are parametric and therefore it might be worthwile to complement this analysis with other
techniques, e.g., nonparametric techniques.1 In this study, the methodology consists of two
steps, a measurement step (estimating the education production function at the individual
level) and an aggregation step (aggregating the actual and potential outcomes for each school
type).2 Both steps are non-parametric, i.e., we impose little a priori structure on the mea-
surement step (to minimize speciﬁcation error when estimating production functions) and on
the aggregation step (to minimize value-laden statements when assessing outcomes).
To set the scene, we brieﬂy present the measurement and aggregation step in more detail
and relate them to the existing literature. We use a nonparametric DEA model to measure
educational eﬃciency at the pupil level on the basis of test scores in mathematics and language
proﬁciency (writing and reading in Dutch). We account for the inputs used (which the
policy makers do control) as well as for possibly diverging ‘environmental’ variables –socio-
economic status of parents and lagged test score results– that might aﬀect pupil performance
(and which often fall beyond the control of policy makers and schools). The environmental
variables control for selection issues, assumed to be based on observables only; see, e.g.,
1Relatively few studies have compared parametric and non-parametric estimation techniques in education;
see, e.g., De Witte et al. (2008).
2The potential outcome is the actual outcome plus the ineﬃciency.
3Altonji et al. (2005b) for selection on unobservables in parametric estimation of education
production.
DEA models have been used before to evaluate the educational eﬃciency at the pupil
level; see, e.g., Grosskopf et al. (1997, 1999), Portela and Thanassoulis (2001), and the ref-
erences therein. In the current study, we propose a DEA model that is specially designed for
educational eﬃciency evaluation: while at the input side it uses the minimal ‘free disposabil-
ity’ assumption (in casu, more input never leads to a lower (potential) performance), at the
output side it uses the linear aggregation that is typical for measuring pupil performance in
primary education (i.e., aggregate performance results are conventionally deﬁned as weighted
sums of the results in separate disciplines). Focusing on linearly aggregated output, it mea-
sures educational ineﬃciency in terms of the diﬀerence between the maximally attainable
output and the actually achieved output.
Three additional features of our DEA model are worth mentioning. Firstly, it uses linear
output aggregation, but it allows for ﬂexible weighting of the diﬀerent performance dimen-
sions. Essentially, such a ﬂexible weighting allows each pupil to be evaluated in terms of
his/her own ‘most favorable’ weighting scheme, which accounts for ‘specialization’ in educa-
tion. At the same time, we avoid undesirable ‘extreme’ specialization by limiting the range
of possible output weights through pre-speciﬁed bounds. Secondly, by suitably adapting the
methodology of Daraio and Simar (2005, 2007) to our DEA model, it can account for out-
lier behavior, while it also allows us to explain observed performance diﬀerences in terms of
diverging environmental characteristics in a nonparametric way. The observed environmen-
tal impact as well as the corresponding environment-corrected eﬃciency results provide an
easy-to-implement tool for attention-direction in the political process. Thirdly, economies of
scale XXX
To compare the aggregate performance of public and private schools, we suggest two
multidimensional stochastic dominance criteria that were introduced by Atkinson and Bour-
guignon (1982). In this view, the overall performance of a school is deﬁned by the sum of
individual performances of their pupils. The individual performance of a pupil is in turn a
4function of the pupil’s actual and potential outcome (i.e., the actual outcome plus the (es-
timated) ineﬃciency). Rather than imposing a speciﬁc functional form for the individual
performance function, Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982) focus on a wide class of functions
which all satisfy principles with which everyone can agree; e.g., the individual performance
functions increase with the pupil’s actual output, ceteris paribus. The resulting dominance
criterion tells us that one school (type) outperforms another if the sum of individual perfor-
mances is higher at the former, for all performance functions satisfying the general principles.
It is thus robust (everyone agrees with the resulting statement), but comes at the cost of
incompleteness (a school (type) could be better according to some, but worse according
to other individual performance functions and is therefore classiﬁed as incomparable). We
believe these aggregation criteria are particularly useful in the context of DEA eﬃciency
evaluation of the public sector. First, they are nonparametric in nature, which naturally
complies with the nonparametric orientation of DEA. Next, it is possible to incorporate a
concern for equity (i.e., ‘higher eﬃciency is especially better for pupils with lower test scores’),
which is particularly relevant within the context of public policy evaluation. As with DEA,
these aggregation criteria are easy-to-implement, which makes them attractive for practical
applications.
The remainder of this paper unfolds as follows. The next section presents our research
question. Section 3 discusses our methodology for evaluating educational eﬃciency at the
individual pupil level. Section 4 presents the eﬃciency results, with a main focus on envi-
ronmental eﬀects. Section 5 discusses the aggregation of the individual eﬃciencies. A ﬁnal
section 6 summarizes our main conclusions.
2 Data and motivation
In general, the literature ﬁnds a positive impact for private schools as they are creating a
higher added value given the characteristics of the pupils. However, past research generally
evaluates private schools which are privately funded (Toma, 1996). As such, the eﬀect of pri-
vate schools could be attributed to both its way of funding (and the incentives which result
5from it), its pupil characteristics (due to the nonrandom selection of pupils) and its poten-
tially more eﬃcient educational system (thanks to ideological background). By considering
a speciﬁc example, i.e. schooling in the Flemish region, we consider only publicly funded
schools which allows us to fully concentrate on the ideological background of the school.
Indeed, in Flanders (and in Belgium in general) both public and private schools are publicly
funded by the regional government and receive full taxpayer funding since 1914. In return,
schools should conform to education programs and regulation which regulates the subjects
taught and the language used. The methods for instruction are left to the schools (for an
extensive discussion, see Toma, 1996).
Whereas the private schools are mainly catholic in Flanders, public schools both originate
from the local and the central level, depending on the level of government initiation. We label
the latter, respectively, as local and Flemish public schools. In line with the literature, the
general belief in Flanders is that private schools perform better (i.e., the cognitive output of
their pupils is thought to be higher on average). However, this statement is somewhat blurred
by two counteracting forces related to inputs and environment. While private schools are said
to have more pupils with an ‘advantageous’ family background, they should also receive less
funding from the ‘Equal Educational Opportunities’ programme of the Flemish government
(see infra). In the remaining of this section, we will deﬁne and describe the inputs, outputs
and environment in the Flemish educational system, which, at the same time, will conﬁrm
the above belief.
We use data from the SiBO-project. The aim of SiBO is to describe and explain diﬀerences
in the primary school curriculum of a cohort of Flemish pupils. The dataset is oversampled as
it consists of a reference group, which is representative for the Flemish population of primary
school pupils, and three additional data sets which allow us to capture speciﬁcf e a t u r e so ft h e
Flemish region. The oversampling is due to (1) including all public city schools of the city
of Ghent, (2) an oversampling to get a suﬃcient number of schools with a high number of
disadvantaged pupils (pupils for whom the schools get additional means in the so-called ‘Equal
Educational Opportunities’ programme of the Flemish government) and (3) an oversampling
6to obtain a suﬃcient number of non-traditional schools. Although we use all pupils together,
we correct for the sample’s non-representative nature in our empirical eﬃciency evaluation.
This leaves us with 3413 pupils (with complete data), of whom 1774 attend private catholic
schools, 1039 local public schools and 553 Flemish public schools. The remaining 47 pupils
take classes in private non-catholic schools. Because we will not include these pupils in our
comparison of school types, the term private schools stands for catholic private schools in
the sequel.
We look at the cohort of pupils in their second year of primary education (2004-2005) –at
the (normal) age of 7– while we use data from the same pupils in the ﬁrst year (2003-2004)
to retrieve environmental variables. We extract 3 types of variables at the individual level,
called inputs, outputs and environmental variables in the sequel.
Financial inputs in primary schools mainly consist of salaries (80%) and operational costs
(20%). As we ap r i o r iassume that the diﬀerences in operational costs are unlikely to cause
diﬀerences in cognitive results, we only focus on inputs related to teaching. Government
assigns instruction units to pupils, which can be freely used by their respective schools to
ﬁnance teachers: 24 instruction units correspond with a full-time teacher. We note that,
in practice, the input allocated by the Flemish government to a particular pupil should not
perfectly correlate with the input allocated by the school to the same pupil, which implies a
possible cause of measurement error. (Our application uses outlier robust ineﬃciency mea-
sures to mitigate this measurement error.) The total number of instruction units assigned
to a particular pupil consists of regular (REG) and additional, so-called ‘equal educational
opportunity’ (EEO), instruction units. Regular (per-capita) instruction units are, roughly
speaking, the same for all pupils, as they are divided among schools on the basis of a scale
which is approximately linear in the number of pupils. The additional EEO instruction units
depend on certain ‘disadvantageous’ pupil characteristics, to wit, the household income con-
sists of replacement incomes only, the pupil is living outside the biological family, the level
of education of the mother is low, the pupil’s family belongs to a travelling population and
–in combination with one of the former characteristics– the home language is diﬀerent from
7Dutch. Table 1 contains some summary statistics for both types of instruction units REG
and EEO over the diﬀerent school types in Flanders.3 Overall, local public schools receive
most instruction units (per capita), private schools the least, while the Flemish public schools
are in between both.
Table 1: (Input) REG and EEO instruction units per school type.



































Output is deﬁned on the basis of test scores in three dimensions: mathematics, technical
reading and writing, collected at the end of the second year. All scores are set between 0
and 100. We calculate a language proﬁciency score as the simple average of the reading
and writing scores. Table 2 provides summary statistics for the mathematics (MATH)a n d
language proﬁciency score (DUTCH)f o rt h ed i ﬀerent school types in Flanders. Private
(catholic) schools do best in both tests. They are followed closely by the local public schools
and, at some distance, by the Flemish public schools.
Table 2: (Output) MATH and DUTCH per school type.
3All reported ﬁg u r e si nt h i sp a p e ra r ew e i g h t e di np r o p o r t i o nt ot h ei n v e r s eo ft h es a m p l i n gp r o b a b i l i t y ,
to correct for the non-representative nature of the dataset.
























Pupil environment is measured by three indices: socio-economic status and entry level in
mathematics and language proﬁciency. First, socio-economic status (SES)r e ﬂects the cul-
tural, social and economic environment of the pupil’s home. We use data that are calculated
as the normalized average of the following three variables: average education level (5 cat-
egories: 1 to 5), average professional status (7 categories: 1 to 7) and total income of the
parents of the pupil (6 categories: 1 to 6); normalization implies that, for each observation,
the diﬀerence (of the average) with the sample mean is divided by the sample standard de-
viation. As for the full sample, normalized values vary between -2.41 (minimum) and 2.63
(maximum); see Reynders et al. (2005) for further details. Next, the starting level in math-
ematics (B-MATH) and language proﬁciency in Dutch (B-DUTCH)r e ﬂect the intellectual
antecedents of the pupil, and is equal to the mathematics and language proﬁciency score of
the pupil at the end of the previous year. As with MATH and DUTCH, these scores are set
between 0 and 100.
Table 3 reports summary statistics for SES, B-MATH and B-DUTCH.W eﬁnd that, on
average, private (catholic) schools attract pupils with more ‘advantageous’ environmental
characteristics compared to local public schools and –to an even greater extent– Flemish
public schools. Notice that the diﬀerences in EEO instruction units between the diﬀerent
school types (reported in Table 1) reﬂect the diﬀerences in SES.
Table 3: (Environment) SES, B-MATH and B-DUTCH per school type.



































To summarize, our data roughly conﬁrm the widely held belief that private (catholic)
schools in Flanders perform better, while they receive less teaching inputs as a consequence
of their more ‘advantageous’ pupil population. Our main research question is how we must
assess these output diﬀerences in a fair way, i.e., by taking the diﬀerences in inputs and
environment into account.
3E ﬃciency measurement: method
Consider a general educational system that is characterized, at the level of each pupil, by p
inputs and q outputs. We denote the corresponding input vector by x ∈ IR
p
+, and the output
vector by y ∈ IR
q
+; in our application, p =1and the input is the sum of the REG and EEO
instruction units, while q =2and the outputs are the MATH and DUTCH scores. The set





+ | x can produce y
ª
.
Educational eﬃciency analysis relates educational input to educational output. As such,
empirical eﬃciency evaluation essentially requires two steps: (1) we need to empirically esti-
mate the feasibility set F; (2) we have to evaluate observed eﬃciency by using an (in)eﬃciency
measure that has a meaningful interpretation in terms of the underlying educational objec-
10tives. These two issues are discussed next. Subsequently, we discuss two additional issues
that will be important for our empirical application: (3) we need to account for outlier ob-
servations in the empirical eﬃciency evaluation; and (4) we want to correct the observed
(in)eﬃciency scores for environmental characteristics, which will also allow us to visualize
the impact of the latter on the former. We construct the model step by step.
3.1 Empirical feasibility set
Usually, the ‘true’ feasibility set F is not observed. To deal with such incomplete information,
the nonparametric approach suggests to start from the set of n observed input-output vectors
S ⊆ F (|S| = n); it assumes that observed input-output combinations are certainly feasible
(e.g., Varian, 1984). In addition, we assume that inputs and outputs are freely disposable,
which means:
if (x,y) ∈ F then (x0,y0) ∈ F for x0 ≥ x and y0 ≤ y.





+ | x0 ≥ x and y0 ≤ y for (x,y) ∈ S
ª
;
i.e., the free disposal hull (FDH) of the set S (e.g., Deprins et al., 1984; Tulkens, 1993).
We brieﬂy discuss the interpretation of the assumptions that underlie the construction of
b F. Firstly, ‘free disposability of inputs’ means that more input never implies a decrease of
the (maximally achievable) output. We believe this is a reasonable assumption in the current
context, where inputs stand for instruction units and outputs stand for pupil performance
(in alternative disciplines). Secondly, ‘free disposability of outputs’ means that more output
never implies a decrease of the (minimally required) input. Once more, we believe this
assumption is tenable in our speciﬁcc o n t e x t .
Finally, the assumption S ⊆ F excludes measurement errors and atypical observations,
such that all observed input-output vectors are comparable (or, alternatively, that all rele-
vant input and output dimensions are included in the analysis). Admittedly, this assumption
11may seem problematic in our application, which compares pupils that may be characterized
by diﬀerent background characteristics (that are not explicitly included in our set of condi-
tioning/environmental variables; see infra: conditional ineﬃciency measure), and which uses
inputs that may be characterized by measurement errors (see supra). Therefore, as we will
explain further on, we will use an eﬃciency evaluation method that mitigates the impact of
potential outliers within the observed set S.
3.2 Ineﬃciency measure
In line with the usual practice in primary education, we focus on output performance (see,
e.g., Worthington, 2001). Speciﬁcally, we use an ineﬃciency measure which is, for a given
input, equal to the maximally possible output performance minus the actual output perfor-
mance. The output performance is measured as a weighted sum of the output performances
in alternative disciplines (captured by the q constituent components of each output vector
y), which again reﬂects the usual practice in primary education. Suppose, that we are to
evaluate a pupil observation (xE,y E) ∈ S (also referred to as ‘observation E’ in what follows)
and that the relevant output weights are given by wE ∈ IR
q
+. For the empirical feasibility set
b F, educational ineﬃciency for this pupil is deﬁned as
θE =m a x
(x,y)∈ e F
½
wE · (y − yE)
wE · g
| x 6 xE
¾
,
with g ∈ IR
q
+ an aggregation vector that deﬁnes the denominator as a weighted sum of the
output weights; we use wE ·g>0. For the given input level, the measure takes the diﬀerence
of (linearly aggregated) maximal output performance over actual output performance; this
diﬀerence is normalized by dividing through the weighted sum wE · g. Clearly, ∞ >θ E ≥ 0.
Eﬃciency implies θE =0 ;a n dh i g h e ri n e ﬃciency values generally reveals more ineﬃciency.
In our application, we set the aggregation vector g equal to a q-dimensional vector of ones,
which implies that the denominator is simply the (equally weighted) sum of weights. We
believe this speciﬁcation of g is appropriate in our application context because the outputs
12(MATH and DUTCH) are measured in a comparable measurement unit: it naturally corrects
for the scale of the output weights wE (i.e., κwE obtains the same results as wE for all κ>0),
while treating the (directly comparable) output dimensions identically. But it should be clear
that, in general, our method also allows for other speciﬁcations of g, which accounts for the
possibility that diﬀerent outputs are expressed in diﬀerent measurement units.4
The measure θE assumes that the weighting vector wE is ﬁxed ap r i o r i . In our application,
we will focus on an alternative ineﬃciency measure that allows for ﬂexible weighting. This
is particularly relevant in the present context, because the teaching curricula are typically
diﬀerent among schools. Speciﬁcally, for each pupil observation we choose ‘most favorable’
weights b wE that minimize the ineﬃciency of the input-output vector under evaluation; this
conveniently allows for ‘specialization’ in learning (at the school level and/or the pupil level):
e.g., if pupils perform relatively well in mathematics, then this discipline gets a relatively
high weight in their ineﬃciency measure. To avoid undesirable ‘extreme’ specialization, we
impose that the endogenously selected relative output weights b wE should respect upper and
lower bounds, which are captured by the set WE ⊆ IR
q
+ characterized in terms of linear
constraints (b wE ∈ WE satisfying b wE · g>0). (The construction of WE for our empirical
application is discussed in the beginning of section 4.) This yields the empirical ineﬃciency
measure





b wE · (y − yE)
b wE · g
| x 6 xE
¾
.
Clearly, for wE ∈ WE we have θE ≥ b θE ≥ 0. The measure b θE, with endogenously deﬁned
most favorable weights, has a directly similar interpretation as the measure θE,w i t hap r i o r i
ﬁxed weights wE.
To conclude, we note that the empirical ineﬃciency measure can be computed by simple
linear programming. Speciﬁcally, given the construction of b F, the computation proceeds
in two steps. The ﬁrst step identiﬁes the set of observations that dominate the evaluated
4In this respect, it is also worth indicating that, for general g, the ‘empirical’ ineﬃciency measure e θE
(cfr. infra) is formally similar to the so-called ‘directional distance function’; see, for example, the duality
results in Chambers et al. (1998, p. 358). These authors also provide a discussion on possible speciﬁcations
of g;w h i l et h e yf o c u so np r o ﬁte ﬃciency, the analogy with our setting is straightforward.
13observation in input terms:
DE = {(x,y) ∈ S | x 6 xE}.
The second step involves the linear programming problem. As a preliminary note, we
recall that b wE · g>0 in the above deﬁnition of b θE, so that we can use the normalization
b wE · g =1(because the set WE only restricts the relative output weights). As such, we can
compute
b θE =m i n
u,e wE∈WE
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
u − b wE · yE |
b wE · g =1
u ≥ b wE · y ∀y :( x,y) ∈ DE
b wE ∈ WE
⎫
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎬
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎭
.
This is a linear programming problem given that the set WE is characterized by linear
constraints. The fact that merely linear programming is required for the computation of
the empirical ineﬃciency measure b θE (after a trivial check of input dominance) makes it
attractive for practical applications.
3.3 Outlier-robust ineﬃciency measure
To mitigate the impact of (potential) outlier behavior and to allow for uncertainty in the
observed sample S,w eu s et h eo r d e r - m method as suggested by Cazals et al. (2002); we adapt
t h em e t h o df o rt h es p e c i ﬁci n e ﬃciency measure b θE deﬁned above. Essentially, in terms of the
terminology introduced above, this boils down to repeatedly drawing (with replacement) R
subsets D
r,m
E (r =1 ,. . . ,R ) from the dominating set DE; each subset D
r,m
E contains (at most)
m (> 1)( diﬀerent) input-output vectors that are selected from DE, i.e., D
r,m
E ⊆ DE and
14|D
r,m
E | ≤ m.5 For each D
r,m
E we compute the corresponding empirical ineﬃciency measure
e θ
r,m
E =m i n
u,e wE∈WE
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
u − b wE · yE |
b wE · g =1
u ≥ b wE · y ∀y :( x,y) ∈ D
r,m
E
b wE ∈ WE
⎫
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎬
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎭
,
which again uses linear programming. Subsequently, the outlier-robust order-m ineﬃciency










Referring to Cazals et al. (2002), this measure has attractive statistical properties and con-
veniently mitigates outlier behavior. See also Simar (2003) for a related discussion.6 As a
ﬁnal note, because it can well be that (xE,y E) / ∈ D
r,m
E ,w em a yh a v ee θ
r,m
E < 0 and thus also
e θ
m
E < 0. We label such observations as ‘super-eﬃcient’.
3.4 Environment-corrected ineﬃciency measure
To capture environmental eﬀects, we use the procedure outlined by Daraio and Simar (2005,
2007). Like before, we adapt this method to the speciﬁci n e ﬃciency measure under consid-
eration by implementing the Daraio and Simar procedure in the outlier correction, which in
turn is an adaptation of the simple eﬃciency evaluation model.
Suppose we want to take up k environmental characteristics, which corresponds to a k-
dimensional vector z of environmental indicators associated with each input-output vector
(x,y); in our application, k ≤ 3 and the vector z captures SES, B-MATH and/or B-DUTCH.
For the evaluated observation E, the Daraio-Simar procedure computes an environment-
5Remark that, to correct for the non-representative nature of our dataset, we take the probability of
drawing a pupil proportional to the inverse of the probability that this pupil appears in the sample due to the
speciﬁc sampling design. A similar qualiﬁcation applies to the environment-corrected ineﬃciency measure
where we weight the Kernel functions by the inverse of the sampling probability.
6Cazals et al. (2002) actually consider an eﬃciency measure that does not consider linear but monotonic
aggregation of the outputs. But their main results carry over to the linear variant that we consider. A similar
qualiﬁcation applies for our use of the procedure of Daraio and Simar (2005) to account for environmental
eﬀects in the eﬃciency evaluation exercise. In fact, these authors also focus on input eﬃciency, while we
translate their procedure towards output eﬃciency.
15corrected ineﬃciency measure by conditioning on the corresponding value zE of the environ-
mental vector: it selects input-output vectors (x,y) ∈ DE with z in the neighborhood of zE.
T h i sg i v e su st h econditional ineﬃciency measure
b θE (zE)= m i n
u,e wE∈WE
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
u − b wE · yE |
b wE · g =1
u ≥ b wE · y ∀y :( x,y) ∈ DE(zE)
b wE ∈ WE
⎫
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎬
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎭
,
with DE(zE)={(x,y) ∈ DE || zE − z| ≤ h} and h a Kernel bandwidth vector. In our appli-
cation, when the number of conditioning variables k is larger than 1,w eﬁrst apply a so-called
Mahalanobis transformation to decorrelate the environmental variables (see, e.g., Mardia et
al., 1979). Afterwards, we perform a sequential Kernel estimation –as if all environmental
variables were independently distributed– to compute the optimal bandwidth vector (via
the likelihood cross-validation criterion). Similar to before, outlier-robust conditional ineﬃ-
ciency measures e θ
m
E (zE) can be obtained by the order-m method; in that case, we use the
Kernel estimates to repeatedly draw subsets of size m.
4E ﬃciency measurement: application
In this section, we focus on visualizing the impact of the environmental variables SES, B-
MATH and B-DUTCH on educational eﬃciency at the pupil level, by using the outlier-
robust order-m ineﬃciency measures described in the previous section. For these measures,
an additional consideration concerns the speciﬁcation of the parameters R (the number of
drawings with replacement) and m (the number of input-output vectors selected from DE in
each drawing). In the following, we discuss empirical results for R =5 0and m = 100 as, from
these values on, the number of super-eﬃcient observations (see supra) in the sample is robust
at around 1%; Daraio and Simar (2007) use similar criteria for deﬁning m. Still, at this point
it is worth stressing that we have also experimented with other values for R (R =1 0 ,25,100)
and m (m =1 0 ,25,50,125,150); these alternative conﬁgurations generally obtained the same
qualitative conclusions. For compactness, we do not include all these results in the current
16paper, but they are available from the authors upon simple request.
As discussed before, our application avoids ‘extreme’ specialization in either DUTCH
or MATH by focusing on a restricted set WE ⊆ IR
q
+ (with q =2 ), which captures upper
and lower bounds of the relative output weights. To construct these bounds, we divide the
number of hours spent on DUTCH in the classroom by the sum of the number of instruction
hours spent on DUTCH and MATH.T h i sr e ﬂects the weight attached to DUTCH (relative
to MATH) in the second year of primary education. The average equals 0.54 –and is very
similar for the diﬀerent school types– while the 1 and 99-percentile values equal 0.44 and
0.71, respectively. These 1 and 99-percentile values will serve as (relative) weight restrictions
for DUTCH (and hence 0.56 and 0.29 for MATH). To check the sensitivity of our main
results with respect to this particular speciﬁcation of WE,w eh a v ea l s oc o n s i d e r e de x t r e m e
scenarios with no weight ﬂexibility (i.e., using 0.50 as a ﬁxed weight for the two outputs
DUTCH and MATH) and full weight ﬂexibility (i.e., WE = IR
q
+,w i t hb wE · g =1for
b wE ∈ WE). Our main qualitative results appeared to be robust for these alternative weight
bounds; the corresponding results will not be reported in the current paper, but they are
available from the authors upon simple request.
4.1 Outlier-robust ineﬃciency measures
Before visualizing the impact of the diﬀerent environmental variables under study, Table
4 provides summary statistics for alternative outlier-robust order-m ineﬃciency measures
(individual eﬃciency scores are available upon request). We report results for the full sample
(see the column ‘all’) and for the subsamples that correspond to the diﬀerent school types
(private schools, local public schools and Flemish public schools).
17Table 4: Some summary statistics for the robust ineﬃciency measures.
school type all private public
environment local Flemish
∅ average 26.99 25.74 27.68 31.61
std. dev. 13.85 13.28 13.78 15.49
minimum -5.70 -3.50 -3.67 -5.70
maximum 74.10 74.03 74.10 71.39
SES average 26.97 25.39 27.43 31.17
std. dev. 13.80 13.25 13.78 15.27
minimum -3.02 -2.85 -3.02 -2.34
maximum 75.96 73.45 75.96 70.03
B-MATH average 24.17 23.00 25.12 27.88
std. dev. 12.34 11.87 12.28 13.62
minimum -5.74 -5.42 -4.92 -5.74
maximum 72.46 61.63 71.52 72.46
B-DUTCH average 23.61 22.61 24.34 27.04
std. dev. 12.35 11.80 12.39 14.03
minimum -6.54 -1.37 -6.54 -0.86
maximum 65.41 62.88 65.41 60.09
B-MATH, B-DUTCH & SES average 17.18 16.34 18.52 18.70
std. dev. 10.16 9.78 10.35 11.04
minimum -17.52 -1.99 -17.52 -3.39
maximum 55.14 49.72 55.14 53.43
Let us ﬁrst regard the unconditional ineﬃciency values (with environment = ∅). Table 4
reports an average ineﬃciency score of 26.99 for all pupils in our sample. In words, the average
pupil achieves an output level that is 26.99 points below the best possible performance for
(at most) the same amount of instruction units (= REG + EEO = input). To interpret this
result, we recall that aggregate output performance is measured as a weighted sum of the
18output performance in the disciplines MATH and DUTCH (using ‘most favorable’ weights for
each individual pupil), and that the MATH and DUTCH scores are both set between 0 and
100. As such, this average shortage of 26.99 points should be compared to a (‘theoretical’)
maximum possible shortage of 100 points. Next, we also observe much variation in the
ineﬃciency scores over pupils. For example, the standard deviation in the ineﬃciency values
is 13.85; and the maximum ineﬃciency value amounts to 74.10 points, while the minimum
value equals -5.70.7 Note, ﬁnally, that we ﬁnd diﬀerences in the distributions for diﬀerent
school types; for example, the average ineﬃciency value for private schools (25.74) is below
that for local public schools (27.68), which in turn is below that for Flemish public schools
(31.61).
In the following, we investigate to what extent these patterns in the distribution of the in-
eﬃciency scores can be attributed to environmental diﬀerences, as captured by the variables
SES, B-MATH and B-DUTCH. The summary statistics in Table 4 provide some prelimi-
nary insights. We ﬁrst consider the separate impact of the social and cultural environment
of a pupil’s home (captured by SES) and the cognitive antecedents of the pupil (captured
by B-MATH and B-DUTCH). As expected, we ﬁnd that all three variables inﬂuence the
pupils’ ineﬃciency values. For example, when focusing on the full sample (see the column
‘all’), the average ineﬃciency reduces (marginally) to 26.97 when controlling for SES,a n di t
reduces (more substantially) to 24.17 and 23.61 when controlling for, respectively, B-MATH,
and B-DUTCH. In addition, we observe a decrease in the variation of the ineﬃciency values;
for example, the standard deviation reduces to 13.80, 12.34 and 12.35 when conditioning
on, respectively, SES, B-MATH and B-DUTCH. This indicates that each individual variable
can explain the observed variation in the ineﬃciency values to some extent. Finally, if we
simultaneously control for SES, B-MATH and B-DUTCH, we observe a further and rather
substantial decrease of the average ineﬃciency value (to 17.18 for ‘all’) as well as the standard
deviation of ineﬃciency values (to 10.16 for ‘all’). This suggests that simultaneous consider-
ation of all three environmental variables can eﬀectively yield additional ‘explanatory’ value
7We recall that negative ineﬃciency values are possible for super-eﬃcient observations because we focus
on outlier-robust ineﬃciency measures.
19in terms of explaining patterns of educational ineﬃciency. The same general conclusions hold
for all three school types (private schools, local public schools and Flemish public schools).
Remark, ﬁnally, that for all speciﬁcations of the conditioning variables that we consider, pri-
vate schools are, on average, more eﬃcient than both types of public schools, and that local
public schools outperform Flemish public schools.
4.2 Environmental eﬀects
To visualize environmental eﬀects and, consequently, to detect whether an environmental
variable is favorable or unfavorable, we adapt Daraio and Simar (2007)’s methodology to our
setting. If z
−j
E denotes the vector of all conditioning variables, except for the j-th entry, and
z
j










on the observed values for z
j
E. If, for a certain range, the regression is decreasing, the j-th
environmental variable is unfavorable to output, behaving as a ‘substitutive’ output in the
educational process. Conversely, an increasing curve indicates a favorable variable that plays
the role of a ‘substitutive’ input in the educational process. Finally, a ﬂat curve suggests















































































































































Figure 1: (Environmental impact) SES, B-MATH and B-DUTCH.
Figure 1 portrays the environmental eﬀects. We ﬁrst consider the variable SES. Generally,
we ﬁnd a positive eﬀect of SES on the educational output for low SES values, and a negative
eﬀect for high SES values; generally, the eﬀect of SES on output gradually decreases for
higher SES values. We infer that, while SES admittedly has some (positive) eﬀect on educa-
tional eﬃciency, much of this eﬀect is already captured by the other two variables B-MATH
and B-DUTCH, which causes the residual impact of SES to be rather low.
Let us then regard the variable B-MATH. Figure 1 reveals a positive impact of B-MATH
on output, which tends to decrease for higher B-MATH values. Compared to the SES
21picture, the positive eﬀect is more pronounced, which provides more convincing support for
this residual B-MATH eﬀect.
Finally, we consider the variable B-DUTCH. The general conclusions drawn from Figure
1a r es i m i l a rt ot h o s ef o rB-MATH: there is a clearly positive eﬀect, wich again decreases
for higher B-DUTCH values. In this case, the positive eﬀect is very clearly marked, and the
observation points are narrowly scattered around the full line, which provides strong support
for this conclusion.
Overall, we believe that our results provide suﬃciently strong support for simultaneous
conditioning on all three variables when comparing the educational eﬃciency for diﬀerent
pupils. Therefore, our aggregation exercise in the next section will mainly focus on such fully
conditioned educational eﬃciency values.
5 Aggregation: eﬃciency versus equity
This section aims to compare the aggregate eﬃciency and equity performance of private
schools, local public schools and Flemish public schools. Speciﬁcally, we start with the pupils’
ineﬃciency values and the corresponding optimal weights that underlie the results presented
in the previous section. Using these pupil-speciﬁc weights to aggregate DUTCH and MATH,
we obtain what we call the ‘actual score’ sa,w i t h0 ≤ sa ≤ 100. Adding the ineﬃciency score
θ to it, we get the so-called ‘potential score’ sp = sa + θ,w i t h0 ≤ sp ≤ 100. It follows from
our previous discussion that these potential scores correct for input diﬀerences (in terms of
REG and EEO instruction units), and avoid extreme specialization in DUTCH or MATH
(through weight bounds). In addition, given that we focus on robust ineﬃciency measures,
it also accounts for possible outlier behavior. Finally, if we use the conditional ineﬃciency
measures, we also correct for environmental diﬀerences (in terms of SES, B-MATH and
B-DUTCH).8
We want to investigate whether one school type is ‘better’ than another in a ‘robust’
8We note that, when conditioning on B-MATH and B-DUTCH, we also correct for the pupils’ starting
level of output performance in the aggregation exercise.
22way, which here means that we impose minimal normative assumptions when aggregating
outcomes. To do so, we focus on two multidimensional stochastic dominance criteria devel-
oped in Atkinson and Bourguignon (AB; 1982). The ﬁrst criterion (FAB) only cares about
eﬃciency, whereas the second criterion (SAB) also takes equity into account.
5.1 Only eﬃciency matters: FAB
We assume that the overall performance of a school can be measured by the average perfor-
mance of its pupils, where the pupil performance is measured via a function P : R2 → R
which maps a pupil’s actual and potential score (sa,s b) into a scalar P (sa,s b). If only educa-
tional eﬃciency matters, then (1) an increase in the actual score sa of a pupil, ceteris paribus
(i.e., for a given potential score sp), must increase the school type’s overall performance,
and (2) the same holds for a decrease in a pupil’s potential score sp, ceteris paribus (i.e.,
for a given actual score sa) .F o r m a l l y ,o n es c h o o lt y p e ,s a yt y p eA, is better than another
school type, say B, according to FAB, denoted A %1 B, if and only if the average perfor-
mance is higher in A than in B for all (diﬀerentiable) performance functions P : R2 → R in
P1 = {P |P0
1 ≥ 0 and P0
2 ≤ 0}.9 A special case of interest is P (sa,s p)=sa − sp = −θ,i n
which case one school type would be judged better if the average ineﬃciency is lower. We
focus on the more general criterion










PdFB ≥ 0, for all P in P1,
with FA and FB the bidimensional distribution functions of the actual and potential scores for
both school types. Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982) provide an equivalent implementable
condition for A %1 B, requiring that (1) the proportion of ‘better’ pupils is higher in A
9In this formulation, P0
1 stands for the ﬁrst derivative of P with respect to the j-th argument (j =1 ,2).
Similarly, P00
12 will stand for the corresponding cross-derivative in our discussion of SAB.
23everywhere and (2) the proportion of ‘worse’ pupils is lower in A everywhere. Formally,





A (sa,s p) − L1
B (sa,s p) ≥ 0, for all (sa,s p) ∈ [0,100]
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A (sa,s p) − L2








0 dFj the proportion of pupils in school type j = A or B who





sp dFj the proportion
of pupils in school type j = A or B who perform deﬁnitely worse. Notice that FAB is a robust
ranking criterion, since it holds for all speciﬁcations of P within P1. Still, it comes at a cost,
since two distributions might turn out to be non-comparable.
Table 5 presents our results for the FAB criterion in equation (1). We consider two extreme
cases: the ﬁrst case (denoted by Z = {REG+EEO;∅}) does account for input diﬀerences
but not for environmental diﬀerences by calculating the potential scores on the basis of
the unconditional ineﬃciency measures e θ
m
E (which coincide with e θ
m
E (zE) for zE empty);
the second case (denoted by Z = {REG+EEO;SES,B-MATH,B-DUTCH}) simultaneously
takes account of input and all three environmental variables (i.e., it is based on the measure
e θ
m
E (zE),w i t hzE capturing SES, B-MATH and B-DUTCH). For each case, Table 5 reports
the dominance relation between the row school type and the column school type: either the
row school type ‘dominates’, ‘is dominated by’, or is not comparable to (‘not comp. to’) the
column type. Two remarks are in order. Firstly, following the usual practice, dominance is
checked at a ﬁnite number of points (sa,s p) ∈ {0,25,50,75,100}
2. Secondly, we use a naive
bootstrap procedure for statistical inference. That is, we calculate the proportion of the
total number of bootstraps, i.e., 10000 drawings with replacement from the original sample,
in which a certain result (‘dominates’, ‘is dominated by’, or ‘not comp. to’) is found.10 In
Table 5 we mention the empirical result for each comparison, together with the corresponding
‘naive’ p-value, i.e., the proportion of times this result was found. A large p-value indicates
a rather robust empirical result.
Considering only average test scores, we saw in Table 2 that private schools outperform
10Notice that, from 5000 bootstrap samples onwards, the results remain stable.
24local public schools, while the latter in turn outperform Flemish public schools. However,
by including both inputs, outputs and exogenous environmental characteristics, the robust
FAB criterion does not support this conclusion anymore. Indeed, the results in Table 5
indicate non-comparabilities between all school types. This result holds for both (extreme)
speciﬁcations of Z that we consider.
Table 5: FAB dominance results for two extreme cases of environment-correction.
Z = {REG+EEO;∅} {REG+EEO;SES,B-MATH,B-DUTCH}
local public Flemish public local public Flemish public












5.2 Equity also matters: SAB
In addition to a preference for eﬃciency, we next include a preference for equity in our
comparisons of the overall performance of diﬀerent school types. The SAB criterion requires
(besides (1) and (2) underlying the FAB criterion) that (3) an increase in a pupil’s actual
score sa is valued more (in terms of performance) for pupils with a higher potential score sp
and (4) a decrease in a pupil’s potential score sp increases performance more for pupils with
a lower actual score sa. To put it diﬀerently, a higher correlation between the pupils’ actual
and potential scores results in a better overall performance of the school type. Formally,
school type A is better than school type B according to SAB, denoted A %2 B,i fa n do n l y
if the average performance is higher in A than in B for all (twice diﬀerentiable) performance
functions P : R2 → R in P2 = {P |P0
1 ≥ 0,P0
2 ≤ 0, and P00
12 ≥ 0}.W eg e t










PdFB ≥ 0, for all P in P2.
25This is equivalent with the implementable condition that the proportion of ‘worse’ pupils is
lower in A compared to B (Atkinson and Bourguignon, 1982), or, formally,
A %2 B ⇔ L2
A (sa,s p) − L2
B (sa,s p) ≤ 0, for all (sa,s p) ∈ [0,100]






sp dFj for all j = A,B.
As before, we consider two extreme cases, depending on whether we only correct for inputs
(case Z = {REG+EEO;∅}) or for both inputs and the complete environment (case Z =
{REG+EEO;SES,B-MATH,B-DUTCH}). Table 6 presents the results. The interpretation
of the diﬀerent entries is similar to that of Table 5, but now pertains to the SAB criterion
in (2). Interestingly, we now do ﬁnd robust dominance relations. If we do not correct for
environmental characteristics, we ﬁnd that the private catholic and the local public schools
(robustly) dominate the Flemish public schools; see the middle column of Table 5. However,
this comparison is not ‘fair’, since it does not correct for school environment at all. Therefore,
we consider the right column of Table 5 as the fairest base of comparison; and we conclude
that these robust dominance results change into either non-robust dominance results or robust
non-comparibility results.
Table 6: SAB dominance results for two extreme cases of environment-correction.
Z = {REG+EEO;∅} {REG+EEO;SES,B-MATH,B-DUTCH}
local public Flemish public local public Flemish public












6C o n c l u s i o n
Focusing on educational eﬃciency, we have presented a nonparametric approach for analyz-
ing public sector eﬃciency which also accounts for equity considerations. Firstly, we have
26designed a nonparametric (DEA) model that is specially tailored for educational eﬃciency
evaluation at the pupil level. It requires minimal ap r i o r istructure regarding the educa-
tional feasibility set and objectives. This is particularly convenient in the current context,
which typically involves minimal ap r i o r iinformation. Next, we introduced multidimensional
stochastic dominance criteria that are particularly well-suited for comparing the aggregate
educational performance of diﬀerent school types; they aggregate pupils’ output while ad-
justing for environment-corrected ineﬃciency. These nonparametric aggregation criteria nat-
urally complement our nonparametric model for evaluating individual (pupil level) eﬃciency.
The ﬁrst criterion is the appropriate criterion if only eﬃciency matters. By contrast, the
more powerful second criterion is recommendable when equity is important in addition to
eﬃciency; such equity considerations are usually prevalent in the context of public sector
eﬃciency evaluation. We have shown that our approach directly allows for adapting the
methodology of Daraio and Simar (2005, 2007), to account for potential uncertainty in the
data and environmental characteristics (in casu the pupils’ educational environment) in the
eﬃciency assessment. Although our application concentrates on educational eﬃciency, the
presented approach is also more generally useful for eﬃciency evaluation in the public sector.
To avoid interaction between the funding of schools (private versus public funding) and
the ideological background, we consider the Flemish situation where both private and public
schools are publicly funded. This particular application demonstrates the practical usefulness
of our approach. First, we have investigated the impact of the ‘environmental characteris-
tics’ socio-economic status (SES), begin-level in mathematics (B-MATH) and language pro-
ﬁciency (B-DUTCH) on the educational output for individual pupils. Generally, we ﬁnd that
all three environmental variables positively impact on the educational output, and that this
positive eﬀect prevails in particular for low initial values for SES, B-MATH and B-DUTCH
values - it may be even negative for high initial SES values. We believe that our results con-
vincingly support that all three environmental variables should simultaneously be accounted
for to obtain a fair eﬃciency evaluation. Next, we have compared the aggregate eﬃciency of
private (but publicly funded) schools, local public schools and Flemish public schools (the
27latter depending on the level of government initiation). Focusing on the ﬁrst stochastic dom-
inance criterion, we ﬁnd that no school type robustly dominates another school type; we
conclude ‘non-comparability’ in all pairwise comparisons. However, the story changes if we
focus on the second criterion; in that case, private catholic and local public schools (robustly)
dominate the Flemish public schools if we do not account for environmental diﬀerences. Still,
if we account for the diverging environmental characteristics of the pupil populations, we no
longer ﬁnd robust dominance relations between diﬀerent school types and, as such, no school
type robustly dominates any other school type. This contrasts with the conclusions of e.g.
Coleman et al. (1982). Given that these aggregate comparisons nonparametrically account
for eﬃciency, equity and environment, we consider them as ‘fairest’ in the (public sector)
evaluation context under study. In turn, the paper demonstrates that school comparisons
on the basis of average scores instead of on the basis of environment corrected scores could
result in biased conclusions.
References
[1] Altonji, J.G., T.E. Elder and C.R. Taber (2005a), Selection on observed and unobserved
variables: assessing the eﬀectiveness of catholic schools, Journal of Political Economy
113 (1), 151-184.
[2] Altonji, J.G., T.E. Elder and C.R. Taber (2005b), An evaluation of instrumental variable
strategies for estimating the eﬀects of Catholic schooling, Journal of Human Resources
40 (4), 791-821.
[3] Atkinson, A.B. and F. Bourguignon (1982), The comparison of multidimensioned distri-
butions of economic status, Review of Economic Studies 49, 183-201.
[4] Cazals, C., J. Florens and L. Simar (2002), Nonparametric frontier estimation: a robust
approach, Journal of Econometrics 106, 1—25.
28[5] Cain, G.G., A.S. Goldberger (1983), Public and private schools revisited, Sociology of
Education 56 (4), 208-218.
[6] Chambers, R., R. Färe and Y. Chung (1998), Proﬁt, directional distance functions, and
nerlovian eﬃciency, Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications 98, 351-364.
[7] Coleman, J., T. Hoﬀer and S. Kilgore (1982), Cognitive Outcomes in Public and Private
Schools, Sociology of Education 55 (2), 65-76.
[8] Daraio, C. and L. Simar (2005), Introducing environmental variables in nonparametric
frontier models: a probabilistic approach, Journal of Productivity Analysis 24, 93—121.
[9] Daraio, C. and L. Simar (2007), Advanced robust and nonparametric methods in ef-
ﬁciency analysis. Methodology and applications, Series: Studies in Productivity and
Eﬃciency, Springer.
[10] Deprins, D., L. Simar and H. Tulkens (1984), Measuring labor eﬃciency in post oﬃces,
The Performance of Public Enterprises: Concepts and Measurements, M. Marchand, P.
Pestieau and H. Tulkens (eds.), Amsterdam, North-Holland, 243—267.
[11] De Witte, K., E. Thanassoulis, G. Simpson, G. Battisti and A. Charlesworth-May (2008),
Assessing pupil and school performance by non-parametric and parametric techniques,
Aston University Working Paper.
[12] Goldstein, H. (2003), Multilevel Statistical Models — Third edition’, Arnold Publisher.
London.
[13] Grosskopf, S., K. Hayes, L. Taylor and W. Weber (1997), Budget-constrained frontier
measures of ﬁscal equality and eﬃciency in schooling, Review of Economics and Statistics
79, 116-124.
[14] Grosskopf, S., K. Hayes, L. Taylor and W. Weber (1999), Anticipating the consequences
of school reform: a new use of DEA, Management Science 45, 608-620.
29[15] Hanushek, E.A. and M.E. Raymond (2005), Does school accountability lead to improved
student performance?, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 24 (2), 297-327.
[16] Mardia, K.V., J.T. Kent and J.M. Bibby (1979), Multivariate analysis, Academic Press
New York.
[17] Portela, M. and E. Thanassoulis (2001), Decomposing school and school type eﬃciencies,
European Journal of Operational Research 132, 357-373.
[18] Reynders, T., I. Nicaise and J. Van Damme (2005), Longitudinaal onderzoek in het
basisonderwijs. De constructie van een SES-variabele voor het SIBO-onderzoek, LOA-
rapport 31.
[19] Sandström, F.M. and F. Bergström (2005), School vouchers in practice: competition
will not hurt you, Journal of Public Economics 89 (2-3), 351-380.
[20] Simar, L. (2003), Detecting outliers in frontier models: a simple approach, Journal of
Productivity Analysis 20, 391—424.
[21] Toma, E.F. (1996), Public Funding and Private Schooling across Countries, Journal of
Law and Economics 39 (1), 121-148.
[22] Tulkens, H. (1993), On FDH eﬃciency analysis: some methodological issues and appli-
cations to retail banking, courts and urban transit, Journal of Productivity Analysis 4
(1/2), 183-210.
[23] Varian, H.R. (1984), The nonparametric approach to production analysis, Econometrica
52, 579-598.
[24] Worthington, A.C. (2001), An empirical survey of frontier eﬃciency measurement tech-
niques in education, Education Economics 9, 245-268.
30